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FOREWORD:
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN WINTER
Daniel Epps*
Six months before the 2016 presidential election, Harvard Law
Professor Mark Tushnet charted a course for the future of
constitutional law on the assumption—one that seemed eminently
reasonable at the time—that Hillary Clinton would win. It was time
for liberals to abandon “defensive crouch constitutionalism,” Tushnet
argued.1 Although the federal judiciary had been controlled by
conservatives for decades, the time was finally nigh for a longawaited, more liberal Supreme Court to aggressively rewrite
constitutional doctrine.2 Tushnet mapped out a number of priorities for
the future, including overruling or narrowing a number of disfavored
precedents and strategically deploying doctrines to aid liberal political
causes on the ground.3 Yet in closing, Tushnet recognized that he
might have been jumping the gun: “Of course all bets are off if Donald
Trump becomes President. But if he does, constitutional doctrine is
going to be the least of our worries.”4
Tushnet did not acquit himself particularly well as a chickencounter. But as to that last remark, he had a point. Given the great risks
that many believe Trump’s ascension to the presidency poses for
American democracy and for the world more generally, perhaps it’s
silly to be too bothered about what sequences of words might appear
printed in future volumes of the United States Reports. Still, that
hasn’t stopped me, like many others, from wondering—and, yes,
worrying—about the election’s consequences for constitutional
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. For helpful conversations
and comments, I am grateful to Devon Carbado, Danielle D’Onfro, Mike Klarman, Daryl Levinson,
Leah Litman, Greg Magarian, and Ian Samuel.
1. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION
(May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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doctrine. Particularly, the consequences for the large body of
constitutional doctrine regulating the criminal justice system that we
call criminal procedure.
And here there is reason to worry, at least for those who think that
criminal procedure should do more to rein in the excesses of the
American criminal justice system. Given possible changes to the
Supreme Court’s membership, numerous doctrines currently
commanding the support of slim majorities could fall or be sharply
curtailed. At the very least, the Court is unlikely to extend criminal
procedure doctrine in novel ways in the immediate future. Those who
were holding their breath for the Court to recognize new rights, or,
say, to declare the death penalty categorically forbidden—possibilities
that felt tantalizingly close just months ago, when Hillary Clinton
appeared on her way to becoming President—are likely to be
disappointed.
Given what might have been, criminal justice reformers will find
these circumstances profoundly disappointing. But this situation has
important lessons for how we think about constitutional criminal
procedure—its past, and its future. This Foreword takes stock of where
constitutional criminal procedure stands given the election’s
consequences for the membership of the Supreme Court. This forum
provides a particularly appropriate opportunity for such reflection.
Though the Supreme Court decided some criminal procedure
decisions of some consequence in October Term 2016,5 by far the
most significant event that occurred that Term at the Court was not a
case but a change in the Court’s membership with the addition of
Justice Gorsuch.
In what follows, I offer some predictions on the path of the
Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence and provide some thoughts
5. By my lights, the most important constitutional cases involving, or at least touching on,
the criminal process include Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (holding that defendant
had shown prejudice from his attorney’s errors about the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea); Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding unconstitutional a statute
prohibiting registered sex offenders from using many social media sites); County of Los Angeles
v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017) (holding that police officer defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity arising out of a non-fatal shooting); Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249 (2017) (holding
unconstitutional a state statute requiring defendants whose convictions were overturned to prove
innocence by clear and convincing evidence to obtain refunds of fines and fees). Though the cases’
implications for criminal justice are not yet fully clear, Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017),
which put significant restrictions on Bivens liability generally, might be last Term’s most significant
constitutional ruling overall.
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about how criminal procedure scholarship might best respond to the
future that looms ahead. In my view, present circumstances present an
overdue opportunity for scholars to reconsider the notion that courts
are the solution to democratic failure. Instead, energy would be better
directed at questions of structure, power, politics, and localism.
I. THE STORY SO FAR
To gain some perspective on our current situation, I’ll provide
here a very brief overview of the broad history of criminal procedure.
Start with the beginning. The Constitution reflects significant concern
for criminal justice. Its original text itself regulates the criminal
process,6 and four amendments of the original Bill of Rights do too.7
Nonetheless, for the first century or so after the founding, federal
constitutional law played a relatively small role in regulating
American criminal justice. At first, federal constitutional law did not
govern the state criminal process at all.8 And federal criminal law
represented a small slice of criminal justice generally.9
Both facts began to change in the twentieth century. Federal
criminal law expanded as commerce between the states increased and
as the federal government became hungrier for tax revenue and more
eager to regulate economic activity.10 And federal constitutional law
started to have a lot more to say about state criminal justice because
of the Fourteenth Amendment.11
Though ratified in 1868, that amendment was not immediately
understood to impose the Bill of Rights’ requirements on state

6. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (jury trial guarantee); see also id. art. III, § 3 (regulating
punishment of treason); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for extradition of indicted criminals between
states).
7. See id. amend. V (Grand Jury, Double Jeopardy, and Self-Incrimination clauses); id.
amend. VI (speedy trial, impartial jury, confrontation, and compulsory-process guarantees); id.
amend. VIII (cruel and unusual punishment); see also id. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures). I note the Fourth Amendment last because at the founding, it was not solely
(or perhaps even primarily) aimed at criminal proceedings as such. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758 (1994) (“[U]nlike the Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments, which specially apply in criminal contexts, the Fourth Amendment applies
equally to civil and criminal law enforcement.”).
8. Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights was understood to apply only to the
federal government. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 243 (1833).
9. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 261–62
(1993).
10. See id. at 261–67.
11. Id. at 267–69.
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criminal prosecutions.12 But over the coming years, the Court would
increasingly use the hook of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause in order to regulate the state criminal process. This
effort picked up steam slowly at first; before 1920, the Supreme Court
had overturned only a small number of state court convictions.13 By
1940, the Court had become more aggressive in its interventions.14 Yet
as late as 1960, there was still not “a substantial body of law regulating
the criminal process.”15
That finally changed in the 1960s. In that decade, the Warren
Court dramatically expanded the scope of constitutional criminal
procedure, imposing most of the requirements of the Bill of Rights on
the state criminal process.16 Mapp v. Ohio17 imposed the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule on the states.18 Gideon v. Wainwright19
guaranteed state-provided counsel in all serious criminal
prosecutions.20 Miranda v. Arizona21 imposed an elaborate set of rules
on police conducting interrogations.22 Massiah v. United States23
prevented law enforcement from questioning defendants without
counsel after indictment.24 Duncan v. Louisiana25 guaranteed trial by
jury for non-petty offenses.26 Brady v. Maryland27 required
prosecutors to give defendants exculpatory evidence.28 These cases
and others “produced what is widely known as the ‘criminal procedure
revolution.’”29
Yet this revolutionary fervor did not last. Rising crime became a
12. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (refusing to require states to comply with
Fifth Amendment’s grand-jury requirement).
13. Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV .
48, 48 (2000).
14. Id.
15. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 79 (2d ed. 2005).
16. Id. at 80.
17. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
18. Id. at 660.
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. Id. at 339–40, 348.
21. 348 U.S. 436 (1966).
22. Id. at 444–45.
23. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
24. Id. at 204–06.
25. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
26. Id. at 158–59.
27. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
28. Id. at 90–91.
29. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s
Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1363–64 (2004).
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national political issue, and Richard Nixon was elected president in
1968 on a platform that included sharp criticism of the Warren Court.30
Nixon was ultimately able to replace four Justices, including Chief
Justice Warren (with Warren Burger), and he and other Republican
presidents were responsible for eleven straight appointments to the
Court between 1969 and 1991.31
The path of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine changed
accordingly—if not immediately. The early Burger Court issued some
opinions in the Warren Court spirit: Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents32 recognized an implied constitutional tort cause of action
against federal law-enforcement officers.33 And Furman v. Georgia34
essentially struck down every death penalty statute on the books
nationwide.35 But fairly quickly, the Court became less interested in
heavy-handed supervision of criminal justice. In Gregg v. Georgia,36
for example, the Court walked back from the precipice it had nearly
jumped off in Furman just four years earlier, again approving states’
use of the death penalty.37
Particularly notable about the new era was how the Court made it
significantly harder to obtain meaningful remedies for constitutional
violations.38 Teague v. Lane39 limited state prisoners’ right to rely on
new constitutional procedural rules announced after their convictions
became final.40 Harlow v. Fitzgerald41 precluded liability for
constitutional torts unless the defendant violated “clearly established
law,”42 a hole that the lower courts have driven trucks through with

30. See TED GEST, CRIME & POLITICS 14–15 (2001).
31. See Justices 1789
to
Present, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S., https://
www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx. In my enumeration, William Rehnquist is
counted twice, as he was first appointed by President Nixon in 1972 before being elevated to Chief
Justice by President Reagan in 1986. Id.
32. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
33. Id. at 422.
34. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
35. Id. at 239–40.
36. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For a gripping history of the Supreme Court’s capital punishment
jurisprudence through Gregg, see EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE (2013).
37. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 155.
38. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2469 (1996).
39. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
40. Id. at 290.
41. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
42. Id. at 818.
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little objection from the Court.43 United States v. Leon44 recognized a
“good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule,45 and later cases have
continued to create or expand further exceptions. 46
The last few decades have, to be sure, not provided an unbroken
string of victories for government interests. Some scholars
downplayed the idea that the Burger Court had effected a counterrevolution in criminal procedure.47 In 1984, the Court recognized a
right to effective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington.48
More recently, a line of Eighth Amendment decisions have restricted
the circumstances under which capital punishment can be imposed,49
as well as limiting the use of life without parole for juveniles.50 And
the Court, in large part due to efforts by Justice Scalia, reinvigorated
the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation and jury trial rights.51
Still, in the bigger picture, it is hard to say that constitutional
criminal procedure has had a particularly successful few decades. The
United States prison population has grown to epidemic proportions.52
A wave of DNA exonerations has undermined confidence in the

43. For a troubling recent example, see Young v. Borders, where the Eleventh Circuit extended
qualified immunity when “police tactically surrounded the home’s only exit, drew their guns,
repeatedly slammed on the door without identifying themselves as law enforcement, and then shot
and killed [the occupant] when he opened the door, as he was stepping back into his home.” 850
F.3d 1274, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017) (Martin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The
Court seems content with the breadth of qualified immunity, and indeed reaffirmed the doctrine’s
importance during October Term 2016 in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017).
44. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
45. Id. at 905.
46. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238–39 (2011) (holding that the good-faith
doctrine applies when officers engage in unconstitutional search pursuant to binding but erroneous
appellate precedent).
47. See, e.g., Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court, in POLICE PRACTICES AND THE LAW 69, 72 (1982).
48. 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). Strickland broke little new ground, however; by 1984, “all
the Federal Courts of Appeals and all but a few state courts” had recognized a constitutional right
to “reasonably effective assistance” at trial. Id. at 683.
49. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (barring death penalty for child rape);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (forbidding capital punishment for juvenile
defendants); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–19 (2002) (forbidding capital punishment for
intellectually disabled defendants).
50. See Miller v. Alabama 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (barring mandatory life without parole
for juveniles); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010) (forbidding life without parole for
juvenile non-homicide offenders).
51. See infra notes 86–87.
52. Numerous observers in recent years have decried “mass incarceration.” See, e.g., TODD R.
CLEAR & NATASHA A. FROST, THE PUNISHMENT IMPERATIVE (2014); MARIE GOTTSCHALK,
CAUGHT (2014); JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN 1 (2017).
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accuracy of adjudicative processes.53 The justice system continues to
produce disparate outcomes that are hard to call anything other than
racist.54 And despite increasing public attention to the problem of
police violence, it remains difficult for victims to obtain justice
through either tort suits55 or criminal prosecution.56 The Supreme
Court has done little to address these problems.57
Quite recently, though, there were glimmers of change. Support
for criminal justice reform had become increasingly mainstream,
causing some scholars to argue that the political phenomenon that had
driven mass incarceration was on its way out.58 On the Court, several
justices indicated interest in significant expansions of rights. Justice
Breyer wrote to announce his newfound view that the death penalty
was categorically cruel and unusual punishment, and Justice Ginsburg
joined him.59 Justice Kennedy signaled interest in declaring solitary
confinement unconstitutional.60 Justice Sotomayor made an
impassioned plea for the Court to take greater account of how police
practices impact people of color.61 The Obama administration made
some high-profile moves related to criminal justice issues,62 and the
President himself even published an article in the Harvard Law
53. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (2011) (analyzing the
first 250 wrongful convictions that were later overturned based on DNA testing).
54. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing that
the criminal justice system is a modern system of racial control).
55. Qualified immunity remains a difficult bar for plaintiffs to clear. See supra note 43.
56. See, e.g., Reuben Fischer-Baum, Allegations of Police Misconduct Rarely Result In
Charges, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:45 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features
/allegations-of-police-misconduct-rarely-result-in-charges/.
57. In some cases, the Supreme Court has exacerbated them. For example, the Court
aggressively reined in damages suits against law-enforcement officers via its summary-reversal
power. See William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1, 3 (2015) (noting multiple pro-government summary reversals in cases arising under §
1983); Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (noting “a disturbing trend regarding the use of this Court’s resources” in
summary reversals).
58. See CLEAR & FROST, supra note 52. For an opposing view arguing that the political forces
supporting mass incarceration are powerful and will not disappear overnight, see GOTTSCHALK,
supra note 52.
59. See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
62. For example, the Department of Justice announced efforts to reduce reliance on private
prisons. This directive was quickly rescinded by new Attorney General Jeff Sessions. See Matt
Zapotosky, Justice Department Will Again Use Private Prisons, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-will-again-useprivate-prisons/2017/02/23/da395d02-fa0e-11e6-be05-1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=
.25fe1f5d0add.
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Review trumpeting his efforts.63
And as the 2016 election approached, it looked like liberals might
finally have a chance to control the Supreme Court after so long in the
wilderness. Justice Scalia’s death in February 2016 created an
immediate vacancy. And it seemed possible, or even likely, that more
vacancies on the Court would follow in short order, given the age of
several of the sitting Justices. Tushnet likely spoke for many when he
announced the impending end of “defensive crouch
constitutionalism.”64
To be sure, it was not obvious that change on criminal justice
issues would happen overnight. President Obama’s nominee, Merrick
Garland, appeared fairly conservative on criminal issues.65 Still, it was
not totally clear that Clinton would re-nominate Garland if she won.
And even if Garland took the bench, other, more liberal Justices might
soon join him. It seemed not unrealistic to predict, for example, that
soon a majority of the Court might hold the death penalty categorically
forbidden.66
But then, of course, Donald Trump shocked the world by winning
the election.
II. WINTER IS COMING
Compared to what might have been, it’s hard to overstate the
consequences of the 2016 election for constitutional criminal
procedure. Had things gone the other way, we might have seen a new
flowering of rights and protections. Instead, what now approaches is a
true winter for criminal procedure. A time of darkness and retreat. At
the very least, a time in which little new can take root and grow.
Begin with the near future. Justice Gorsuch sits in Justice Scalia’s
seat. We don’t know for sure how Justice Gorsuch might vote on
criminal issues over the course of his career. He has been on the Court
for a relatively short time, and we haven’t seen his votes in many
63. See Barack Obama, The President’s Role in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 130
HARV. L. REV. 811 (2017).
64. See Tushnet, supra note 1.
65. See Charlie Savage, In Criminal Rulings, Garland Has Usually Sided with Law
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/us/politics
/merrick-garland-supreme-court-nominee.html.
66. See CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH 255–80 (2016)
(exploring the possibility that the Supreme Court could soon declare the death penalty
unconstitutional).
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criminal cases yet. But the few data points we have, plus a larger set
of opinions from his time as a judge on the Tenth Circuit, provide
some information. In what follows, I’ll provide a brief analysis of
Justice Gorsuch’s criminal jurisprudence. That analysis has some
intrinsic interest, but it’s especially useful because of the seemingly
close parallels between Justice Gorsuch’s approach and that of his
predecessor, Justice Scalia. I’ll offer some thoughts as to what I think
is good in the Scalia/Gorsuch approach, but I’ll also stress the ways in
which that approach is unable to address the most significant problems
faced by the criminal justice system. Recognizing the shortcomings of
the formalism championed by Justice Scalia, and that we should
expect Justice Gorsuch to champion, is especially valuable, because
that approach seems like the realistic best-case scenario for new
appointments to the Court in the next few years.
Start with the good news. Justice Gorsuch won’t be a reflexive
vote in favor of the government’s interests in criminal cases. He
compares favorably to some of the potential alternatives—such as
Eleventh Circuit Judge William Pryor, who could have been expected
to vote more like Justice Alito (who usually favors government
interests) on criminal issues. In some of his circuit opinions, Judge
Gorsuch has appeared quite solicitous of defendants’ rights—at least
where those rights line up with his understanding of the Constitution’s
original meaning.
For example, in both United States v. Carloss67 and United States
v. Ackerman,68 then-Judge Gorsuch ruled in favor of Fourth
Amendment claims using originalist reasoning based on premises
about common-law property protections,69 an approach that Justice
Gorsuch has seemed to adhere to in questions in oral argument in
recent Fourth Amendment cases.70 The journalist Radley Balko, an
expert on police violence,71 found these decisions “encouraging.”72 In
67. 818 F.3d 988 (10th Cir. 2016).
68. 831 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 2016).
69. See Carloss, 818 F.3d at 1006; Ackerman, 831 F.3d at 1301.
70. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, 46, Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018)
(No. 16-1371); Transcript of Oral Argument at 45–46, Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018)
(No. 16-1027); Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018) (No. 16-402).
71. See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP (2013).
72. Radley Balko, In Gorsuch, Trump Gave Democrats a Gift. They Should Take It., WASH.
POST (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/02/01/ingorsuch-trump-gave-democrats-a-gift-they-should-take-it/?utm_term=.7be7eef7de17.

(6)51.2_EPPS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

388

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/5/19 4:12 PM

[Vol. 51:379

Balko’s eyes, these opinions show that Justice Gorsuch is likely to hew
closely to the Fourth Amendment approach of Justice Scalia, who
“was often very good on the Fourth Amendment.”73
Balko’s assessment of Justice Scalia is correct as far as the
substance of the Fourth Amendment is concerned. Especially in his
later years on the Court, Justice Scalia wrote a number of important
opinions defending Fourth Amendment rights. In Kyllo v. United
States,74 Justice Scalia concluded that police use of a thermal imaging
device was a search normally requiring a warrant.75 So too with GPS
devices attached to cars in United States v. Jones.76 Likewise, he
authored the 5-4 opinion in Florida v. Jardines77 holding that police
use of a drug-sniffing dog on a homeowner’s porch was a search.78 In
Maryland v. King,79 another 5-4 decision, he dissented forcefully,
arguing that taking DNA swabs from arrestees based on suspicion was
unconstitutional.80 And in Arizona v. Gant,81 he provided the fifth vote
to abandon a broad reading of New York v. Belton82 that permitted
automobile searches incident to the driver’s arrest for any crime.83
Though Justice Scalia’s record as a Fourth Amendment champion is
not spotless,84 other good examples exist.85
Justice Scalia also defended defendants’ rights in two aspects of
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence: the jury trial right86 and the
73. Id.
74. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
75. Id. at 34–35.
76. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
77. 569 U.S. 1 (2013).
78. Id. at 11–12.
79. 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
80. Id. at 469.
81. 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
82. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
83. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351–54.
84. Most notably, he authored Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which has been
heavily criticized for approving the use of routine traffic stops as a pretext for investigating other
crimes based on racial profiling. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but
Unconstitutional: Racial Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 882, 884 (2015) (citing criticism). Whren, however, was a unanimous decision, so
it’s therefore weak evidence that Justice Scalia was particularly pro-government on Fourth
Amendment issues. More troubling, perhaps, is his majority vote in the 5-4 Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), which permitted arrests for the violation of any crime.
85. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(explaining why police lack authority to detain departing occupants of a home when executing a
search warrant there).
86. In a long line of cases, the Court has held that the Sixth Amendment requires that juries,
not judges, find facts that increase a defendant’s sentence beyond the statutory maximum. Justice
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Confrontation Clause.87 On these issues, however, we have much less
guidance from Judge Gorsuch’s lower court opinions. A recent Sixth
Amendment-focused analysis of those opinions found few useful data
points outside of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel context. 88
But elsewhere there is more evidence of Justice Gorsuch’s
affinity for Justice Scalia’s approach to criminal cases. Consider
United States v. Games-Perez, 89 where then-Judge Gorsuch displayed
a flair for textualism in criminal law—another Scalia trademark.90 The
defendant in Games-Perez was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a weapon.91 On appeal, he argued that the government
should have had to prove he knew he was a felon when he possessed
the weapon.92 The majority rejected his argument as foreclosed by
circuit precedent.93
Judge Gorsuch concurred in the judgment.94 Though he found the
case “easy” given precedent, he argued that the prior decision “simply
can’t be squared with the text of the relevant statutes” and “defies

Scalia played a crucial role in laying the intellectual foundation for these holdings. See, e.g.,
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 303 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
87. Dissenting in Maryland v. Craig, Justice Scalia argued that the majority had lost sight of
the Confrontation Clause’s meaning. See 497 U.S. 836, 863 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 359 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
Justice Scalia’s reading of the Confrontation Clause ultimately prevailed in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 69 (2004), overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 56–57 (1980).
88. See Abbee Cox & Katherine Moy, Restraint and the Rights of Criminal Defendants: Judge
Gorsuch on the Sixth Amendment, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 140, 143 (2017). The authors
concluded that Judge Gorsuch’s approach in ineffective-assistance cases was fairly governmentfriendly. See id. at 143–45. Justice Gorsuch’s votes as a Supreme Court justice provide some
confirmation of that prediction; he joined the 5-4 majority in Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058
(2017), which held that federal habeas courts may not consider a procedurally defaulted claim of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel even if state post-conviction counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to raise that claim. Id. at 2062–64.
89. 667 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2012).
90. Justice Scalia often urged narrow textual readings of criminal statutes. See, e.g., Sekhar v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2723–27 (2013) (holding that Hobbs Act extortion does not include
“attempting to compel a person to recommend that his employer approve an investment”); United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (upholding a narrow definition of
bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201). To be sure, though, Justice Scalia was an equal-opportunity
textualist. See, e.g., Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 399, 408 (1998) (rejecting “an exception
to criminal liability under 18 U. S. C. § 1001 for a false statement that consists of the mere denial
of wrongdoing, the so-called ‘exculpatory no’”).
91. Games-Perez, 667 F.3d at 1136.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1140.
94. Id. at 1142.
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linguistic sense.”95 When the Tenth Circuit denied rehearing en banc,
Judge Gorsuch dissented, stressing the human stakes involved. “There
can be fewer graver injustices in a society governed by the rule of law
than imprisoning a man without requiring proof of his guilt under the
written laws of the land,” he lamented.96
Games-Perez concerns substantive criminal law, not criminal
procedure. But Justice Gorsuch’s opinions read as if they are
motivated by concerns about constitutional values, rather than merely
a preference for textualism for its own sake. Put another way: while
there are many reasons one might endorse textualism,97 Justice
Gorsuch seems drawn to textualism at least in part because of deepseated views about rule-of-law values. His concern for ensuring that
defendants are convicted only under the correct interpretation of a
criminal statute seems rooted in a faith that strictly following the
formal separation of powers is the key to preserving liberty.
Indeed, one of the few data points from Justice Gorsuch’s brief
tenure on the Supreme Court supports this take. In Hicks v. United
States,98 he concurred in the Court’s decision to grant certiorari, vacate
the judgment below, and remand for further consideration.99 The
defendant had been sentenced to a 20-year mandatory minimum under
a statute that was repealed by the Fair Sentencing Act before his
sentencing.100 The Court held in Dorsey v. United States101 that
defendants in that position were entitled to the benefit of the amended,
more lenient, sentencing regime.102 The defendant in Hicks, though,
had failed to make that argument on appeal.103 Over the Chief Justice’s
strong objection, Justice Gorsuch agreed that Hicks should get to
argue to the court of appeals that his sentence was plain error entitling
him to relief.104 Apparently troubled that “a man was wrongly
95. Id. at 1143 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
96. United States v. Games-Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1117 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
97. For example, Adrian Vermeule defends textualism under an institutional rationale, arguing
that, given judges’ limited capacities for acquiring information, the costs of judicial inquiry into
extra-textual sources when interpreting statutes outweigh any benefits. See ADRIAN VERMEULE,
JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 183–205 (2006).
98. 137 S. Ct. 2000 (2017) (mem.).
99. Id. at 2000 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. 567 U.S. 260 (2012).
102. Id. at 261.
103. Hicks, 137 S. Ct. at 2000.
104. Id.
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sentenced to 20 years in prison,” Justice Gorsuch could not “think of
a good reason to say no” to the defendant’s request.105
In several other circuit opinions, then-Judge Gorsuch wrote
separately to emphasize separation-of-powers concerns. In United
States v. Nichols,106 for example, he dissented from denial of rehearing
en banc to argue that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act107 (SORNA) improperly delegated to the Attorney General the
power to decide “whether and on what terms sex offenders convicted
before the date of SORNA’s enactment should be required to register
their location or face another criminal conviction.”108 He argued that
“[i]f the separation of powers means anything, it must mean that the
prosecutor isn’t allowed to define the crimes he gets to enforce.”109
And in two immigration opinions that have buoyed conservatives
skeptical of the regulatory state, he questioned the Chevron doctrine
on separation-of-powers grounds.110
Here, again, Justice Gorsuch has much in common with his
predecessor. Justice Scalia was a staunch defender of formalism in the
separation of powers, as he made clear in his famous dissent in
Morrison v. Olson,111 as well as in other writings.112 Indeed, Justice
Scalia often voiced his view that separation-of-powers issues were
more important than Bill of Rights cases.113 This was not because he
thought individual rights were unimportant; instead, pointing to lofty
individual-rights guarantees in the constitutions of totalitarian
countries, he argued that rights were “not worth the paper they were
printed on” if the constitution did not also “prevent the centralization
of power in one man or one party, thus enabling the guarantees to be
105. Id.
106. 784 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 2015).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012).
108. Nichols, 784 F.3d at 668 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court ultimately reversed
the defendant’s convictions on statutory grounds, thus avoiding any constitutional issue. See
Nichols v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016).
109. Nichols, 784 F.3d at 668 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
110. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring); De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015).
111. 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 901 (1991); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 465
(1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct.
2550, 2592 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of
Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
113. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Foreword: The Importance of Structure in Constitutional
Interpretation, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1417 (2008).
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ignored.”114
Justice Gorsuch seems to share Justice Scalia’s view that
“[s]tructure is everything.”115 Consider this, from a 2016 speech:
To the founders, the legislative and judicial powers were
distinct by nature and their separation was among the most
important liberty-protecting devices of the constitutional
design, an independent right of the people essential to the
preservation of all other rights . . . . [R]ecognizing,
defending, and yes policing, the legislative-judicial divide is
critical to preserving other constitutional values like due
process, equal protection, and the guarantee of a republican
form of government.116
In a broad sense, it’s hard to dispute the importance of
constitutional separation of powers. As Madison recognized, a written
constitution’s guarantees of individual rights would be mere
“parchment barriers” in the absence of appropriate structural checks
“against the encroaching spirit of power.”117 Some attention to
dividing and diffusing governmental power is necessary, lest the Bill
of Rights become as irrelevant as the Soviet Constitution, which
Justice Scalia used as an example.118
The problem, though, is that Justice Gorsuch, like Justice Scalia
before him, seems to place more faith in the precise details of the
founders’ design than is deserved. Put another way, both seemed to
think—especially when it came to criminal justice—that judges’ only
job is to adhere strictly to the fine-grained formal rules about
separation of powers that they saw as required by the original meaning
of the Constitution, and that judges need not consider how present
arrangements practically map on to the concerns about concentrated
power that so worried Madison and other framers.
This point has the most relevance when it comes to plea
bargaining, a practice that a chorus of commentators has sharply
criticized.119 A consistent complaint is that our system’s approach to
114. Id. at 1418.
115. Id.
116. Neil M. Gorsuch, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the Legacy of Justice
Scalia, 66 CASE W. L. REV. 905, 912 (2016).
117. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
118. See Scalia, supra note 113, at 1418.
119. One particularly common criticism is that plea bargaining is unfairly coercive, given the
“trial penalty” that defendants pay if they insist on a jury trial. See, e.g., Conrad G. Brunk, The
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plea bargaining—in which judges defer to prosecutors and provide
little scrutiny of the bargaining process—puts far too much power in
the hands of one person, the prosecutor. Rachel Barkow has argued,
for example, that “the virtually unreviewable exercise of prosecutorial
discretion over charging and bargaining . . . stands in sharp tension
with the separation of powers” laid out in the Constitution.120 Going
even further, William Stuntz argued how a unity of interests on
criminal justice issues between the political branches led to a strategy
in which legislators broadly delegate to prosecutors by drafting overly
broad laws and letting prosecutors decide who really deserves
punishment through the only adjudicative process that really
matters—the charging decision and plea negotiations.121 As he put it,
the true role of substantive criminal law “is to empower prosecutors,
who are the criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”122
Not everyone is quite so critical of the present state of affairs, to
be sure.123 But even those who are less troubled by modern pleabargaining practices tend to recognize the realities of how power is
actually concentrated. For example, Gerard Lynch—a former federal
prosecutor, now a judge—has explained how, given the nature of plea
bargaining today, prosecutors act as the frontline adjudicators in the
criminal process.124
Whatever the merits of this approach, it is hard to square with the
simple, three-branch system of separated powers of the founder’s
design. Today trials are the exception, not the rule; the bargaining
process, not the jury trial, is the only adjudication that most defendants
receive. Yet I fear that due to interpretive method, Justice Gorsuch—
like Justice Scalia before him—will simply be unwilling to grapple
with this fundamental reality.
Consider Williams v. Jones.125 Charged with first-degree murder,
Problem of Voluntariness and Coercion in the Negotiated Plea, 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 527, 542–52
(1979); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 13–14 (1978).
120. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989,
1044 (2006).
121. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506
(2001).
122. Id.
123. For the best argument for delegation to prosecutors via broadly drafted laws, see Samuel
W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008).
124. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117 (1998).
125. 571 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
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the defendant was offered a plea to second-degree murder with an
accompanying ten-year prison term.126 Though the defendant wished
to accept the deal, defense counsel was so convinced of his client’s
innocence that he threatened to withdraw from representation if the
defendant accepted the offer.127 The case went to trial; the defendant
was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without
parole.128 The state court system agreed that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective, and ordered as a remedy a sentence of life
with parole—the lowest sentence available for first-degree murder.129
In a habeas posture, the Tenth Circuit panel majority found this
remedy constitutionally inadequate.130
Then-Judge Gorsuch dissented. He did not dispute that counsel
was constitutionally deficient.131 Nonetheless, he argued that the
defendant was not prejudiced by the ineffectiveness.132 Because “the
plea bargain is a matter of prosecutorial grace, not a matter of legal
entitlement, a defendant who loses the chance for a deal cannot be said
to have been treated unfairly,”133 at least if he is convicted “after an
entirely fair trial.”134 When the en banc court denied rehearing, thenJudge Gorsuch protested vehemently.135
Here, again, Justice Gorsuch is on the same page as Justice Scalia.
Three years after Williams, the Supreme Court addressed the same
question in Lafler v. Cooper136 and Missouri v. Frye.137 Echoing Judge
Gorsuch’s views, Justice Scalia lamented in Lafler that the majority
was setting aside a conviction even though the defendant “received the
exorbitant gold standard of American justice—a full-dress criminal
trial.”138
My goal is not to quibble with Justice Gorsuch’s vote in Williams
(or, really, even Justice Scalia’s in Lafler and Frye). My real concern
is about what Williams reveals about how Justice Gorsuch thinks about
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1088.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1092–94.
Id. at 1096 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1099.
Id. at 1101.
Id. at 1099.
Williams v. Jones, 583 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
566 U.S. 156 (2012).
566 U.S. 134 (2012).
Lafler, 566 U.S. at 186 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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criminal justice more generally. It is one thing to conclude that courts
cannot create a judicially enforceable remedy when an attorney
erroneously advises a defendant to go to trial and reject a plea offer.
But to insist that “a defendant who loses the chance for a deal cannot
be said to have been treated unfairly”? That requires ignoring
reality.139
Plea bargaining is how our system resolves the overwhelming
majority of cases.140 For most defendants, getting a good deal is the
whole ballgame. And in a world where legislators draft criminal
penalties knowing that almost all cases will be disposed of via plea,
the harsh sentences imposed on defendants who insist on trial look less
like the appropriate baseline from which to measure the pleabargaining “discount,” and instead more like the “trial penalty” that
many observers have decried.141
In such a world, to insist that a plea bargain is merely “a matter
of prosecutorial grace”142 seems to require willful blindness to how
things really work. As the Lafler majority put it, the argument that “[a]
fair trial wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel
during plea bargaining . . . ignores the reality that criminal justice
today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”143
More generally, it’s baffling how a judge can say “[i]f the separation
of powers means anything, it must mean that the prosecutor isn’t
allowed to define the crimes he gets to enforce,”144 while elsewhere
seeming so blasé about plea bargaining—a system that, as noted, is
particularly troubling for how it effectively concentrates so much
power in one person’s hands.
But perhaps this all reads too much into Williams. Justice
Gorsuch, in his off-the-bench comments, has expressed reservations
about overcriminalization;145 someone who recognizes that problem
should recognize the dangers that it poses when combined with plea
139. Williams, 571 F.3d at 1101 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
140. See, e.g., LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING:
RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargainingResearch
Summary.pdf (noting estimates “that about 90 to 95 percent of both federal and state court cases
are resolved through” plea bargaining).
141. See Stuntz supra note 121.
142. Williams, 571 F.3d at 1103.
143. Lafler, 566 U.S. at 169–70.
144. United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 668 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc).
145. See Neil M. Gorsuch, Law’s Irony, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 743, 747–48 (2014).
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bargaining. And perhaps Justice Gorsuch’s majority vote in Class v.
United States,146 which held that a guilty plea does not inherently
forfeit the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of
conviction, suggests he will do more to rein in plea bargaining than
Williams might suggest.147 Still, given all Justice Gorsuch’s
similarities with Justice Scalia—and given that Justice Gorsuch
himself seems to see Justice Scalia as a role model—it’s more than
fair to ask whether the newer Justice’s jurisprudence will have the
same limitations as that of the man whose seat he is filling.
Those limitations were real indeed. Though there is plenty to
admire in Justice Scalia’s decisions on the meaning of particular
constitutional provisions, he seemed remarkably unconcerned about
effective enforcement of constitutional rights. Take the Fourth
Amendment. For all Justice Scalia’s bluster about fidelity to the
founders’ values,148 he consistently voted against rulings that would
meaningfully enforce those values. In other words, despite a solid
record on the substance of Fourth Amendment law, his record on
Fourth Amendment remedies was weak.
He appeared dead-set against the exclusionary rule: He wrote
Hudson v. Michigan,149 which made the suppression remedy
unavailable for violations of the Fourth Amendment’s knock-andannounce requirement.150 And he joined other opinions expanding
further exceptions to exclusion. 151 To be sure, the exclusionary rule
was a twentieth-century innovation, and so perhaps it’s unsurprising
that Justice Scalia, as a committed originalist, would disfavor it. But
damages remedies for unreasonable searches and seizures, by contrast,
were well known at the Founding.152 Yet here too, Justice Scalia’s
contribution was mainly to limit access to meaningful remedies. He
favored expanding qualified immunity,153 making suits against
146. 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018).
147. Id. at 803.
148. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I doubt that
the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths
for royal inspection.”).
149. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
150. Id. at 599.
151. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009); see also Orin Kerr, The Court after
Scalia: Scalia’s Absence May Help Preserve the Exclusionary Rule, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 16,
2016, 10:51 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalias-absencemay-help-preserve-the-exclusionary-rule/.
152. See Amar, supra note 7, at 774.
153. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–43 (2011).
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defendants who violated the constitution more difficult. And he also
seemed to be no particular fan of liability for municipalities whose
employees violated constitutional rights either.154
Yet if significant barriers exist for all of those potential
remedies—exclusion, a suit against an individual officer, or a suit
against the officer’s employer—it’s unclear what meaningful work
substantive Fourth Amendment law is doing. If only a violation of
“clearly established” law or an unconstitutional municipal policy
enables a damages remedy, and if exclusion only applies when the
violation is the result of willful wrongdoing (a direction in which the
law seems to be heading)—many, perhaps most, violations of the
Fourth Amendment will trigger no remedy. In such a world,
government actors’ incentives to shape their conduct to the Fourth
Amendment letter—rather than merely to avoid the most egregious
violations—are quite attenuated.
It’s unclear whether Justice Gorsuch’s approach to Fourth
Amendment remedies is as limited as Justice Scalia’s. The evidence is
equivocal. On the Tenth Circuit, he upheld the rights of plaintiffs to
seek damages for constitutional violations.155 He dissented when his
colleagues granted an officer qualified immunity after arresting a
seventh grader for “trading fake burps for laughs in gym class.”156
Nonetheless, an examination of his body of work in this area found
that Justice Gorsuch “harbors a robust—though not boundless—vision
of qualified immunity.”157 Exactly how boundless a vision remains to
be seen.
But let us emerge from the weeds. In the bigger picture, it seems
fair to predict that Justice Gorsuch’s jurisprudence on criminal issues
will look much like Justice Scalia’s. It will have many of the same
virtues—a principled insistence on following the letter of the
Constitution, even if doing so results in letting a criminal go free. But
it will likely suffer from the same deficiencies, too. Like Justice Scalia,
Justice Gorsuch will probably be quite talented at writing opinions
zeroing in on the meaning of individual constitutional provisions, but
154. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72–76 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
155. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Las Cruces, 584 F.3d 888, 902 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with majority’s reversal of summary judgment in favor of
defendant).
156. A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1169 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
157. Shannon M. Grammel, Judge Gorsuch on Qualified Immunity, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
163, 163 (2017).
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he will be less likely to take consideration of how the larger legal
framework effectuates or stymies underlying constitutional values.
One whose vision is finely trained at discerning individual trees, but
less able to see (or, perhaps, less interested in seeing) the forest as a
whole.
What should be most sobering, though, is that going forward
Justice Gorsuch likely represents the best-case scenario from the
perspective of those who favor strong criminal procedure protections.
And things seem likely to get worse: In summer 2018, Justice
Kennedy retired and was replaced by Brett Kavanaugh after a
contentious confirmation battle.158 If Justice Kavanaugh turns out to
be more conservative on criminal procedure issues than his
predecessor—which seems likely—a number of precedents will be in
jeopardy.159 Indeed, the real question is likely to be whether Justice
Kavanaugh will be a conservative like Justices Gorsuch and Scalia—
whose originalist approach leads to results that favor defendants in
some classes of cases—or one like Justice Alito, who is generally
deferential to the government.
Even if the Court doesn’t significantly contract existing doctrine,
the more important point is that there is little prospect that the Court
will significantly expand criminal procedure rights in the coming
years, as reformers had hoped. It seems unlikely that Justice Breyer
will get to five votes in his quest to declare the death penalty
categorically impermissible. Nor, with his retirement, will Justice
Kennedy ever get a chance to create constitutional doctrine limiting
solitary confinement.
Most fundamentally, no one should expect the coming Court to
take on responsibility for addressing the larger problems with
158. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaughsupreme-court.html.
159. Over the years, Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote in several important cases
involving criminal justice. Most notable are the line of Eighth Amendment cases categorically
limiting the imposition of particular punishments for particular classes of defendants. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (forbidding, by a 5-4 vote, mandatory life without parole
for juvenile defendants); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (forbidding, by a 5-4 vote,
capital punishment for the crime of child rape). Perhaps the most important example outside the
Eighth Amendment context is J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 263 (2011) (holding, by a 54 vote, that a child’s age is relevant to whether he is in custody for purposes of Miranda). See also
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 499 (2011) (upholding, by a 5-4 vote, an order requiring California
to release prisoners to remedy “serious constitutional violations in California’s prison system” that
“persisted for years”).
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American criminal justice. Mass incarceration, racial disparities in
punishment, over-use of lethal force by police officers, prosecutorial
misconduct, prison conditions, and civil forfeiture abuse are all
problems that the political process has, thus far, been unable to solve
on its own. Yet reformers will need to look beyond the Court for help.
Where there is a clear and specific textual hook to an enumerated
constitutional provision, the Court could further the cause of
reform.160 But the Justices likely to control the Court will not view it
as their role to think creatively about how constitutional law can be
brought to bear to improve the larger problems with the criminal
justice system.
Perhaps that is all as it should be. There are good arguments that,
in a system of separated powers, judges shouldn’t think of themselves
as having a roving commission to solve all the problems with the
criminal justice system. My goal here is not to resolve that question.
Instead, what matters here is a prediction: given the likely composition
of the Court going forward, reformers will not be able to look to the
federal judiciary to rescue the criminal justice system from problems
created by democratic failure.
III. THE PATH FORWARD
I’ve tried to predict the near future of constitutional criminal
procedure. Perhaps those predictions are wrong. But assuming they
are mostly right—what then? As I see it, there are a number of lessons
that scholars—in particular, those who are at least partly motivated by
a desire to reform the criminal justice system—should draw. In my
view, scholars should reevaluate their assumptions about the role of
courts in light of a future where there is little reason to expect countermajoritarian heroics from the Supreme Court.
Criminal procedure scholarship and pedagogy was long
dominated by a narrow focus on courts and on the Supreme Court in
particular.161 This emphasis made sense, at least if one thinks of
criminal procedure as “basically, a subset of constitutional law” in
160. Justice Thomas recently suggested he has concerns about the constitutionality of civil
forfeiture. See Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 850 (2017) (mem.) (Statement of Thomas, J.).
161. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 789, 789 (2003) (“For four decades, criminal procedure scholars have focused on
federal constitutional rulings by the Supreme Court.”); David Alan Sklansky, Police and
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1703 (2005) (“[T]hinking about criminal procedure has
tended to focus on the questions taken up by courts . . . .”).
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which “the Supreme Court makes the relevant policy judgments.”162
Scholarly articles thus often focused on judicial doctrine and couched
reform proposals in the form of judge-directed arguments for doctrinal
revision.
In recent decades, however, scholars came to realize that a great
deal about criminal procedure that mattered was not captured by a
study of case law. And so there has been a commendable shift towards
focusing less on doctrine as such, and more on how criminal
procedure’s “abstract rules play out in the real world.”163 Scholars
routinely ask questions that reading Supreme Court cases alone cannot
answer—questions about racial disparities in criminal justice,164 the
collateral consequences of arrests,165 and the realities of prosecutorial
decision-making,166 to name a few. And such scholarship, to the extent
that it is accompanied by any policy recommendations, is not always
directed at a judicial audience.
The decline of court-focused scholarship seems likely to continue
if the courts become even less willing to intervene in the criminal
justice system than they have been recently. To be sure, many forms
of doctrinal scholarship still have great value; scholars do a great
service by clarifying, organizing, and reconceptualizing the case law.
But what is less likely to be particularly helpful is scholarship seeking
to advance the cause of criminal justice reform using arguments
directed at courts.
If such scholarship continues, it will be most fruitful to the extent
that it is aimed at developing “conservative” arguments for criminal
procedure protections. For example, consider recent work by both
Beth Colgan and John Stinneford, both using historical evidence to
argue in favor of understandings of the Eighth Amendment that are
broader than those the Justices sympathetic to originalism have thus
far been willing to embrace.167 Or take William Baude’s recent claim
that qualified immunity doctrine cannot be squared with fundamental
162. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1997).
163. Bibas, supra note 161, at 790.
164. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 1 (2013).
165. See, e.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015).
166. See, e.g., Paul T. Crane, Charging on the Margin, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 775 (2016).
167. See Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277 (2014);
John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel
Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008).
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principles of statutory interpretation,168 an argument to which Justice
Thomas recently indicated he might be receptive.169 While there is no
guarantee that arguments like these will translate into changed
doctrine (nor is that necessarily these particular authors’ goals), such
work is at least written in conservative judges’ and justices’ native
language. Reform-minded scholarship directed at judges that proceeds
largely from arguments about fairness and empirical realities, or that
seeks to build on Warren Court-vintage cases without rooting its legal
arguments further back in history, is unlikely to persuade a majority
of the justices anytime soon.
But the situation today should prompt even deeper soul searching
among students of criminal procedure. For a long time, scholars
argued (or just assumed) that courts were the appropriate institutions
to regulate the criminal justice system. Such an assumption made
sense in a world where political actors had failed to set meaningful
limits on law enforcement and where courts were ready and willing to
step in. As Anthony Amsterdam made the point regarding the
regulation of police practices, constitutional regulation was necessary
in light of “longtime, wholesale ‘legislative default.’”170
Indeed, that basic insight developed into the near-consensus
justification for the Court’s efforts during the revolutionary Warren
Court years. The dominant narrative justifying the Court’s aggressive
intervention draws on John Hart Ely’s political process theory.171
Voters and their elected representatives lack sufficient regard for the
interests of criminal suspects and defendants, the story goes. Courts—
which are somewhat insulated from democratic political pressures—
must step in to fill the void and provide appropriate regulation that
political actors will not.172 Criminal procedure’s longstanding focus
168. See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45 (2018).
169. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment) (citing Baude, supra note 168) (noting that “some evidence supports the conclusion
that common-law immunity as it existed in 1871 looked quite different from our current doctrine”).
170. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
378 (1974). Amsterdam, though, did not treat courts as the complete solution; he also envisioned
an important role for police self-regulation. See id. at 379.
171. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
172. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 1079, 1093–94 (1993); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process
Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 766 (1991); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles,
107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 850 (1994); see also William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the CivilCriminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 21 (1996) (“If there is a consensus theory of why
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on courts, then, rested not just on the positive view that judicially
created doctrine provided the rules that mattered, but also on a
normative view about courts as the best-situated regulators of criminal
justice.
In recent years, however, many scholars have started to urge a
different course. There are several criticisms of the conventional
argument in favor of courts. Perhaps the most common one is that
courts simply lack the institutional capacity to regulate the criminal
justice system effectively.173 Courts, by design, can only intervene in
the context of individual cases. This fact limits both their perspective
(as many problems in the criminal justice system are systemic or
structural) and their toolkit for solving constitutional problems. For
this reason, a nascent movement has argued for a greater reliance on
administrative agencies to regulate criminal justice.174 Along similar
lines, Orin Kerr makes a case for broader deference to legislatures, at
least in areas like the regulation of emerging technologies where, he
argues, courts are at a comparative institutional disadvantage.175 There
are other criticisms of courts, too; Stuntz went so far as to argue that
constitutional regulation of criminal procedure by courts had perverse
effects, contributing in part to mass incarceration.176
But other scholars have come out to defend courts from the
skeptics. David Sklansky argues that Kerr and other critics of courts
have overstated legislatures’ willingness and ability to meaningfully
protect privacy.177 Andrew Crespo contends that courts actually have
a much greater capacity to understand “systemic facts” about the
criminal justice system than most have assumed.178 And Stephen
Schulhofer has strongly challenged Stuntz’s perversity critique,
arguing that evidence of any causal link between the Court’s rulings
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions got it right, the Carolene Products-Ely argument
is it.”).
173. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1827, 1865–77 (2015).
174. See, e.g., id.; Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment as Administrative Governance, 68
STAN. L. REV. 1039, 1109–12 (2016).
175. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 857–82 (2004).
176. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 236–43
(2011).
177. See David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think about Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 227–33 (2015).
178. See Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2050 (2016).
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and penal severity is lacking.179
Present circumstances provide no clear answers to these debates.
Yet, in my view, the situation raises even deeper questions. As noted,
scholars have long looked to courts given their comparative
advantages in political insulation. The story goes that courts must
solve the problems that the political process cannot—or, perhaps more
accurately, courts must solve the problems the political process
creates. But it should be clear that the Supreme Court is unlikely to
come to criminal defendants’ rescue anytime soon. Given where
things stand, it seems appropriate to ask whether the notion of courts
as the cure for democratic failure really makes sense at all. Here, I
confess to being a skeptic. The problem, as I see it, is that courts do
not stand outside of politics as much as the classic process theory
argument imagines. Supreme Court Justices do not stand for election,
sure. But they are chosen by the President and confirmed by the Senate
against a backdrop of public engagement. If voters and their elected
officials really are strongly inclined towards severity on criminal
matters, as scholars of criminal justice believe, the courts are unlikely
to stand in the way—at least for any sustained period.
The history of criminal procedure proves the point. For starters,
it is not clear that even the Warren Court’s criminal procedure
revolution itself is a paradigmatic example of process theory in action.
As Corinna Lain has argued, much of the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure jurisprudence accorded with majority preferences, or at
least was not quite as politically controversial as we assume today.180
But even if Lain overstates the case, it is hard to extricate the criminal
procedure revolution from the larger context of the Court’s efforts to
defeat the evils of segregation. As Klarman has shown, modern
criminal procedure doctrine was born from cases dealing with Jim
Crow justice.181 Indeed, a number of Warren Court criminal procedure
cases at the very least had race in the background.182 Thus, “Warrenera constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of
179. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights,
111 MICH. L. REV. 1045 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note 176).
180. See generally Lain, supra note 29.
181. See Klarman, supra note 13, at 65.
182. For example, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), did not mention the race of the
defendant, but was unmistakably a case about unfair racial caste enforcement. See Nancy J. King,
Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal Regulation of State Juries, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 262 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
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antidiscrimination law.”183 Whether the criminal procedure revolution
would have happened absent the unique history of race is hard to
know.
And even if the Warren Court cases lie within the process theory
heartland, later events help illustrate that theory’s limits. After the
high-water mark of the 1960s, Richard Nixon and later Presidents
replaced the Warren Court Justices. With few exceptions, these
appointments pushed the Court right on criminal issues. Since the
1960s, the Court has not completely capitulated to the political
branches, to be sure. It has not forsworn all the Warren Court
precedents; and in some areas the Court has certainly recognized new
rights.184 Yet few who envision a major regulatory role for courts
would give the Justices’ efforts unqualified praise. The Court has done
little to address, let alone solve, the biggest problems facing the
criminal justice system. It has stayed on the sidelines as mass
incarceration advanced. It has declined opportunities to stem racial
profiling.185 And it has done much less than it could have to address
police violence.
Yet how realistic is it, really, to think the Court might have done
more? The conventional narrative in criminal justice is that voters and
their elected officials are not merely indifferent towards criminal
issues, but that political winds blow strongly in favor of punitive
policies.186 In such a world, could anyone realistically expect that
tough-on-crime political forces would work tirelessly to change the
law through legislative efforts and prosecutorial elections—but ignore
judicial selection, and let the courts do whatever they want? Far from
it, victims’ rights advocates and law-enforcement interests have a big
voice in the nomination and confirmation process. It’s thus anything
but surprising that, for example, several Justices have prosecutorial
experience, but not a single former criminal defense attorney has sat

183. Stuntz, supra note 162, at 5.
184. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (overturning precedent that
narrowly interpreted the scope of the Confrontation Clause); Atkins. v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002) (holding that mentally disabled defendants cannot be subject to capital punishment);
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (recognizing that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”).
185. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
186. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 1029–30 (2006).
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on the Court in a quarter century.187
Indeed, the nomination of Merrick Garland is telling. Despite
being seen as a fairly reliable liberal vote on most issues, Garland
seemed much more conservative in criminal cases—perhaps due to his
service as a federal prosecutor.188 Despite some clucking from the
liberal commentariat,189 President Obama faced no meaningful
political pushback on the left.
To be sure, as recounted above, there was some hope for real
change on the Court had Hillary Clinton won. The election certainly
could have gone differently, in which case the Court would suddenly
be poised to do much more for the criminal justice system. Yet in that
alternate universe, it would not be courts standing alone, defending
individual rights against political actors determined to take those
rights away. Instead, the people would have voted for the candidate
who had made criminal justice reform part of her platform.190 Instead,
of course, swing-state voters elected the candidate who used toughon-crime rhetoric not heard on the national stage in decades.
Perhaps all this should be less surprising when we remember the
context in which process theory arose. Ely’s theory was not solely—
or perhaps even primarily—a forward-looking project, mapping a
course for courts to take. Instead, his (like some other famous
constitutional theories of his era191) was at least in part a backwardlooking project of justification, one that particularly focused on the
Warren Court’s liberal decisions.192 As a normative grounding for
seemingly anti-democratic decisions, especially as carefully
reconstructed by Michael Klarman,193 Ely’s theory has much to offer.

187. Dara Lind, There Hasn’t been a Criminal Defense Lawyer on the Supreme Court in 25
Years. That’s a Problem., VOX (Mar. 22, 2017, 10:54 AM), https://www.vox.com
/2016/3/28/11306422/supreme-court-prosecutors-career.
188. See Savage, supra note 65; see also Tom Goldstein, The Potential Nomination of Merrick
Garland, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 26, 2010, 4:30 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/04/thepotential-nomination-of-merrick-garland.
189. See, e.g., Daniel Denvir, Inside Merrick Garland’s Troubling Record, SALON (Mar. 17,
2016, 9:59 AM), https://www.salon.com/2016/03/17/inside_merrick_garlands_bleak_record _why
_he_could_take_the_supreme_court_right_in_one_very_important_regard/.
190. See Criminal Justice Reform, THE OFFICE OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON,
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/criminal-justice-reform/.
191. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
192. Ely’s dedication of his book to his former boss, Chief Justice Earl Warren, is telling in this
regard. See ELY, supra note 171, at v (“For Earl Warren. / You don’t need many heroes / if you
choose carefully.”).
193. See Klarman, supra note 13.
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The idea that courts should step in to solve problems that the political
process should, but for some structural reason cannot, answers the
famous challenge of the “countermajoritarian difficulty”194 while also
suggesting some outer bounds on the Court’s role.
Yet as a predictive account of how courts actually will work, or
as a prescriptive theory of how courts should work, process theory is
much less appealing. It is one thing for courts to stand against political
winds in isolated instances or for short periods. But to expect that they
can and will do so indefinitely is unrealistic. The political process
influences judicial selection. And precisely because (definitionally)
political-process failures are unlikely to be remedied politically, that
process is unlikely to select for judges who follow process theory. As
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule put it, “judicial behavior cannot be
treated as exogenous or a deus ex machina—a miraculous intervention
from outside the system.”195 And indeed, history bears out this
critique; as Barry Friedman argues, far from being a consistently
counter-majoritarian force, the Court has generally hewed “closely to
the mainstream of popular judgment about the meaning of the
Constitution.”196 And where the Court does reject mainstream opinion,
it is likely to engender significant backlash—such as the vehement
response of state legislatures to Furman, which likely contributed to
the Court stepping away from the brink in Gregg.197
The objection, to be clear, is not so much about courts’ ability to
meaningfully regulate the criminal justice system if they wanted to.
On this point, Crespo, for example, provides good arguments why
courts could do more than the critics alleging “transactional myopia”
believe.198 The concern, instead, goes to courts’ willingness to act as
meaningful change agents, at least in any long-term, ongoing way.
Courts unquestionably could do more. The problem is that they choose
not to, and the reasons they do are predictable to the point of being
194. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–23 (2d ed. 1986).
195. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Inside or Outside the System?, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
1743, 1765 (2013).
196. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14 (1st ed. 2009). Whether the Justices are
directly influenced by public opinion, or whether “the same forces that influence public opinion
. . . influence judges simply because they are members of the public too” remains unclear. Either
way, the result is the same. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 88 (2013).
197. See Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283,
289–90 (2008) (describing “unprecedented speed and vehemence of the legislatures in reenacting
their death penalty statutes” post-Furman).
198. See Crespo, supra note 178, at 2051–54.
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essentially inevitable.
This is not to say that courts have no comparative advantages over
other institutions. Courts are more politically insulated than
legislatures, and so it is not incoherent to think they might do
somewhat more to protect defendants than legislatures will, at least on
matters where tough-on-crime passions run particularly high.199 The
problem, though, is that they are simply not insulated enough—and
can never be insulated enough—to do all that criminal justice
reformers would have them do. Perhaps courts have the ability to
tackle and solve the biggest problems facing the criminal justice
system. But even if they do, they simply are not willing to do so. And
even if they were willing today, they would refuse tomorrow. If courts
are the only hope, our hopes will be dashed in the end.
But courts need not be the only hope. Here, I submit, criminal
procedure has much to learn from public law more generally. For a
time, liberal public law scholars, like criminal procedure scholars, saw
in the Warren Court the promise of a cure for democratic failure. This
period perhaps reached its peak with Frank Michelman’s 1969
Harvard Law Review Foreword laying out the case for using the
Fourteenth Amendment as a doctrinal weapon against poverty.200 But
in the Nixon years and beyond, cases like Washington v. Davis201
made clear that the courts would be much less active than many had
hoped.
Public-law scholars have grappled for decades with that reality.
Klarman and Gerald Rosenberg have, for example, questioned courts’
ability to serve as agents of meaningful social change.202 Others, like
Larry Kramer and Tushnet, have developed theories of popular
constitutionalism in which the people themselves have a greater role
in shaping and implementing constitutional values.203 Friedman has
199. For a compelling argument that legislatures are more likely to protect defendants when the
crimes at issue are ones that legislators themselves, or those they know, might be accused of, see
Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes)
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599 (2004).
200. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
201. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
202. See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2006); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (2d ed. 2008).
203. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004); MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). Tushnet seems to have had no
trouble getting over his objections to judicial review when it seemed like liberals might control the
Court. See Tushnet, supra note 1.
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shown how the Court has been more receptive to public opinion than
people typically assume.204
The point is not that each of these insights applies
straightforwardly to the criminal justice context. Arguments against
judicial review, for example, may not readily and directly translate to
the criminal sphere, “where judicial engagement is unavoidable.”205
The point, instead, is that public-law scholars have at least introduced
a conceptual vocabulary that those studying the criminal justice
system could build on in developing new ways of thinking for a new
era.
Skepticism of courts might seem hard to swallow in criminal
justice, where it is an article of faith that courts are the only solution
to a politics tilted against the interests of criminal defendants and
suspects. But this is a lesson that must be learned. If courts cannot be
relied upon to save society from democratic failure, the only
alternative is to address democratic failure directly. Judge Learned
Hand’s famous words come to mind:
[A] society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no
court can save; that a society where that spirit flourishes, no
court need save; that in a society which evades its
responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that
spirit, that spirit in the end will perish.206
For too long, too many have assumed that courts, and only courts,
can defend the spirit of moderation when it comes to criminal justice.
But this amounts to merely magical thinking. The best-designed legal
arguments are no substitute for the harder work of political organizing
and action. If the political system consistently produces bad outcomes,
the only real and lasting solution is to work within the political system
to change those outcomes. There are no shortcuts.
This is not to say that legal scholars cannot effectuate change.
Some scholarship can spur on social movements, drawing attention to
problems and providing intellectual support for political efforts.
Michelle Alexander’s work has been particularly successful in this
regard.207 But scholars can also generate insights that can ultimately
204. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 196.
205. Crespo, supra note 178, at 2060.
206. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155, 164 (3d ed., 1960).
207. See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 220 (2017) (describing how Alexander’s
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advance reform, even if the causal chain is less direct.
Perhaps the most pressing need is deeper empirical knowledge; it
is almost shocking how many things we don’t know about the
system.208 For example, despite widespread consensus that mass
incarceration is a terrible problem, there’s significant disagreement
about who’s to blame. John Pfaff points the finger at prosecutors rather
than legislators,209 but his findings are hotly contested.210 Other
accounts emphasize race, 211 political economy,212 and unique aspects
of American culture.213 While answering these questions isn’t easy,
making some progress would be immensely helpful. One cannot hope
to cure an illness without understanding what disease is causing the
symptoms.
Other avenues of research have promise as well. Stuntz drew
attention to the importance of structure in shaping policy in criminal
justice.214 But more remains to be done. Though prosecutors are
almost certainly the most powerful actors in criminal justice, our
understanding of their motivations and behavior remains quite
limited.215 And despite consensus that the politics of criminal justice
are flawed, not enough has been done to help understand the
relationship between structural features of the system and political
conditions. Public law scholars have started to systematically examine
how formal structural arrangements interact with underlying political
conditions and power relationships.216 Extending that line of inquiry
into criminal justice would be worthwhile.
book “profoundly influenced” D.C. Council’s marijuana decriminalization debates). For a
somewhat critical take on Alexander’s arguments, see James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass
Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21 (2012).
208. See Tom Meagher, 13 Important Questions About Criminal Justice We Can’t Answer, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 15, 2016, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/
05/15/13-important-questions-about-criminal-justice-we-can-t-answer#.qXdzRN5De; see also
PFAFF, supra note 52, at 16–17 (2017).
209. See PFAFF, supra note 52.
210. See Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass
Incarceration, 117 MICH. L. REV. 835 (2018) (questioning Pfaff’s findings).
211. See ALEXANDER, supra note 54.
212. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONERS’ DILEMMA (2008).
213. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE (2003).
214. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 176; Stuntz, supra note 121.
215. See Daniel Epps, Adversarial Asymmetry in the Criminal Process, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762,
846–51 (2016).
216. See, e.g., Daryl Levinson, Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2016);
Ganesh Sitaraman, The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101
CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2016).
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That project holds great theoretical interest, but it also offers
practical guidance. A deeper understanding of structure, and its
relationship with political forces, could provide guidance for how
reform could be effective. Though, as the conventional narrative tells
us, political winds generally blow against defendants, those winds
may be less strong at particular times. During brief windows when
reform might be possible, it is critical that reformers know where their
efforts might most fruitfully be directed. It would also help to have a
better sense of which reform efforts are most likely to be durable in
the face of shifting political winds; identifying structural reforms that
might counteract political biases against criminal defendants should
be a priority. Here, too, public law can help provide inspiration, as
scholars have started to ask how reforms can be self-reinforcing
through political entrenchment.217
Federalism and localism also deserve renewed attention in
criminal justice. Recently, a movement led by Heather Gerken has
explored how devolving power to lower levels of government might
actually serve ends typically associated with “nationalist” values.218
Such an approach seems especially promising in criminal justice. The
dominant paradigm in criminal procedure for the last century has been
one in which a national Supreme Court nudged (or shoved) along state
and local governments unwilling to do the right thing on their own.
But this model may soon seem increasingly outmoded. Indeed, many
have noticed that, in the same cycle that elected President Trump,
several reform-minded district attorneys also won their races.219 At
least in the medium term, reform appears likelier to come from the
state, local, and community level than from the Court. Scholars have
already directed efforts at community-level reforms,220 but likely more
can be done.
Many other questions are worth asking; here, I suggest only a few
possibilities. There’s no guarantee that asking these questions will
solve the criminal justice system’s problems. But it can’t hurt, and it
has a better chance of being helpful than holding out hope, despite all
217. See Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment in Public Law, 125
YALE L.J. 400 (2015).
218. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123
YALE L.J. 1889 (2014).
219. Eli Hager, Against the Trump Tide, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 25, 2017, 10:00 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/01/25/against-the-trump-tide#.fP5in2rdm.
220. See, e.g., Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585 (2017).
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evidence to the contrary, that courts will come to the rescue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The future that looms threatens to be a period of darkness for
constitutional criminal procedure; perhaps even an end of one vision
of the role of courts. But if nothing else, these circumstances give
criminal procedure scholars an overdue opportunity to rethink
assumptions about the role of courts and to ask new questions about
structure, politics, localism, and power. What comes next need not be
an end; it can be a new beginning.
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